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Abstract: Crowdfunding is gaining popularity as a way of financing social sustainable initiatives. 
We performed a controlled economic experiment in MTurk by simulating a crowdfunding platform 
and developed a theoretical model that rationalizes herding behavior. The experiment was designed 
to test and quantify the causal effects of revealing specific information to prospective backers: (i) the 
number of early contributors already financing the project and (ii) positive opinions of other backers 
versus those of experts. The results show that early contributions to the campaign and positive 
opinions of peers act as a reinforcing signal to potential backers and affect backers’ beliefs about the 
probability of success, increasing contributions to the campaign. Furthermore, we show that 
herding is rational and set expectations on when we should observe rational herding and when not. 
The theoretical model captures the rational herding, which may be the main information 
aggregation path in reward-based crowdfunding platforms, and can help managers increase the 
likelihood of success in crowdfunding campaigns. 
Keywords: crowdfunding experiments; consumer behavior; peer effects; rational herding; sharing 
economy; new management strategies; sustainable projects 
 
1. Introduction 
Given that sustainable-oriented initiatives face considerable obstacles in raising funds from 
traditional channels, crowdfunding has become a fast-growing way of financing environmental and 
social sustainable projects through the Internet [1–4]. However, most crowdfunding campaigns do 
not succeed in securing funds [5]. In order to increase the success likelihood, it becomes important to 
understand how the crowd behaves in this context. Moreover, as Petruzzelli et al. (2019) point out, 
increasing the successful crowdfunding campaigns on sustainable-oriented initiatives can act as a 
mechanism to sensitize public opinion with regard to sustainability issues and further stimulate 
individuals to behave following sustainable models [4]. 
In crowdfunding, unlike in traditional funding methods, many individuals (the crowd) provide 
funds directly to entrepreneurs rather than through a financial intermediary, to whom oversight of 
investment has traditionally been delegated. To reflect this key distinction, crowdfunding has been 
explicitly defined as a venture “without standard financial intermediaries [6].” Crowdfunding 
platforms represent a new type of intermediary, bringing together fund seekers and a huge crowd of 
small fund providers [7–9].  
Given the uncertainty about a campaign’s probability of reaching the funding goal, and 
problems of asymmetric information associated with entrepreneurial financing, crowdfunding 
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platforms and fund seekers face major challenges related to the information and signals to be sent to 
prospective backers.  
On the other hand, with so much uncertainty, herding is common in all types of crowdfunding 
[10,11]. Herding can be described in terms of imitating the majority. Given the widespread 
phenomenon of herding in crowdfunding, understanding the mechanisms that drive herding is of 
immense importance.  
Specifically, knowing whether herding in crowdfunding is rational would help measure the 
herding causal effect—rational observational learners interpret the herd by making unbiased 
inferences from the decisions they observe [12]. In sequential choice settings, it may be optimal, ex 
ante, to imitate observed behaviors [13,14]. Thus, rational herding requires observers to make 
unbiased inferences from the decisions they observe. If irrational herding were assumed, the herding 
effect would be underestimated by ignoring powerful rational drivers that add to irrational herding 
behavior. We show that herding in this context is rational and set expectations about when we 
observe rational herding and when not.  
Therefore, learning how rationality may be integrated with herding behavior is important to 
design management strategies to maneuver the herd in order for environmental and social 
sustainable enterprises to succeed in crowdfunding. 
Previous empirical research has explored herd behavior related to (i) early contributions and to 
(ii) the influence of peers’ and experts’ recommendations in crowdfunding and has shown the 
importance of conditions related to high funding achievement [10,11,15–18]. However, while 
empirical studies generally confirm that previous backers and peers’ and experts’ recommendations 
relate to high funding achievement, they provide an incomplete insight into the degree to which those 
pieces of information distort the allocation of resources, and fail to offer direct causality. For example, 
successfully funded initiatives may have accomplished the funding goal due to past positive ratings, 
or, alternatively, they may have got past positive ratings because they are of the highest quality, and 
thus achieve the funding goal. 
These empirical limitations may be overcome through randomized experiments. Previous 
experiments on social influence on the internet and crowdfunding [19–25] generally find that early 
contributions and positive opinions explain significant increments in subsequent contributions, 
which suggest that these results will become generalized.  
We go further and present an ad hoc controlled online economic experiment where subjects were 
rewarded depending on their decisions and those of others. Thus, information and payoff 
externalities are present, as occurs in crowdfunding markets. In this way, the experiment allows us 
to analyze the influence of rational herding on decisions in crowdfunding. 
The controlled economic experiment through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) simulated a 
crowdfunding platform. Mturk is suitable for experiments with a large number of experimental 
subjects, 847 in this case. Additionally, the subject pool was diverse, including residents in the United 
States and in India, and an adjusted proportion of men and women (250 men and 250 women from 
the United States; 250 men and 97 women from India), instead of the usual undergraduate 
population.  
The experiment was designed to test the causal effects of revealing specific information to 
prospective contributors (i.e., backers) of a reward-based crowdfunding platform. More precisely, 
the experiment tested the causal effects of two pieces of information on choices by prospective female 
and male contributors (backers): (i) the number of early contributors already financing the project; 
and (ii) the positive opinions of other backers and/or experts. 
The results of the controlled economic experiment show that early contributions affect backers’ 
beliefs about the campaign’s probability of success, thereby increasing contributions to the campaign. 
The results also confirm that positive opinions of peers, as shown nowadays in online social 
networks, are more important than experts’ comments in increasing campaign contributions. Positive 
opinions of peers act as a proxy for subsequent contributions. 
In this paper, we also develop a model that captures rational herding and shows that it acts as 
the main information aggregation path in reward-based crowdfunding platforms. Herding is shown 
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in the experimental setting and supported by the theoretical model. Revealing information influences 
backers’ beliefs regarding projects’ probability of success and, consequently, alters backers’ choices. 
Our contribution to the rational herding literature in crowdfunding is twofold. On the 
experimental side: this is the first controlled experiment in crowdfunding with a large and diversified 
number of participants (men and women, from the United Sates and from India), that tests the causal 
effect and quantifies the extent by which backers respond to the information announced by a 
crowdfunding platform. On the theoretical side: we give theoretical support to our experimental 
results by modeling backers’ beliefs as a random variable, whose mean is updated over time, as new 
information is announced. Thus, we analyze the backers’ best response to the platform actions. The 
impact of information on choices is analyzed by the comparison of the posterior distributions 
conditional to choices. Backers’ best responses to information provide a good guide for crowdfunding 
platforms’ future decisions on which information to release in crowdfunding campaigns. Finally, we 
show that herding is rational and set expectations about when we should observe rational herding 
and when we should not.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. Section 3 
presents the theoretical model and describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 
presents the experimental results and their theoretical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper by 
offering conclusions and managerial implications. 
2. Background 
The concept of crowdfunding is derived from a broader concept, namely crowdsourcing [26]. In 
crowdsourcing, a task previously performed by a bank employee is outsourced to a crowd of people 
in the form of an online open call [27]. This online open call reaches the crowd through a 
crowdfunding platform. Project creators post their projects and define a reward scheme (a menu of 
reward items and their prices) to attract backers. Information between project creators and backers is 
asymmetric [28]. Creators know the real quality of their projects and have a better idea of the funding 
probability of success, whereas backers do not. Backers lack the necessary information to properly 
estimate the chances of success of the proposed campaign. 
The four major crowdfunding models—donation-based crowdfunding, reward-based 
crowdfunding, crowdinvesting, and crowdlending—differ in terms of the reward that backers 
receive. In donation-based crowdfunding, backers pledge funds but receive no financial 
compensation; crowdinvesting refers to participation by multiple individuals in the uncertain future 
cash flows of a firm or project in the form of equity, mezzanine, or debt finance; crowdlending 
provides fund seekers with fixed-interest loans to be repaid to a large number of lenders [29].  
Of these four models, reward-based crowdfunding, the model examined in this research, is 
primarily used by entrepreneurs to finance the manufacture of new products or services. Backers are 
compensated with either a tangible reward (e.g., a sample of the final product) or an intangible 
reward (e.g., having their name written on the product packaging). It has been pointed out that 
reward-based crowdfunding has the potential to democratize the access to innovation and 
entrepreneurship [30], and therefore the potential to impact new initiatives aimed at sustainability. 
Additionally, when asymmetric information is important, it has been argued that high-quality 
projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding [31]; although other authors, as Belleflamme et al. (2014), 
claim that asymmetric information favors equity-based crowdfunding.  
Kickstarter, which is one of the world’s largest platforms connecting fund seekers with 
contributors, provides a useful example to explain the dynamics of reward-based crowdfunding. 
Kickstarter focuses on creative projects and does not accept charitable causes. Members, after joining 
the online community, can ask for funding for their ideas, contribute to others, and post comments. 
On one side are the members aiming to undertake a project (creators). They must publish a 
description of the deliverables to be produced with the contributed funds, along with visual content, 
a statement of the purpose of the project, the funding goal, and the duration of the campaign. During 
the funding cycle, creators can post updates to encourage additional support for their projects.  
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Funding is provided on an all-or-nothing basis. Although backers are refunded if the campaign 
fails (i.e., if the project does not reach its funding goal), backers face a monetary (payoff externality) 
and a non-monetary opportunity cost when the fundraising goal is not achieved [32]. Supporters are 
primarily attracted by a purchasing motive that, in some cases, is combined with an altruistic and 
involvement motive, which is the purely internal satisfaction derived from contributing to a worthy 
cause (altruistic) and the utility of having public recognition of a contribution (involvement) [33]. 
Additionally, some scholars suggest that contributors meet their human need for social affiliation by 
engaging in communities of like-minded members [34] and satisfy their desire of patronage because 
they are aware of their role in contributing to the success of a project [35]. Research related to 
behavioral finance has started to study the drivers of the investment in crowdfunding and has 
confirmed that altruism may play a role [36,37]. Thus, there is intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for 
rational herding in project funding [37]. 
Therefore, a major source of uncertainty relates to a campaign’s probability of success in terms 
of reaching the funding goal [38]. Additionally, the probability of success provides the main payoff 
or opportunity cost. Although reward-based crowdfunding platforms have handled massive 
amounts of funding, prospective backers are very often uncertain about an entrepreneur’s ability to 
attract enough contributions to fund the project. Projects on Kickstarter have raised approximately 
$4 billion from 16 million backers. However, 64.12% of the crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter have 
failed to reach their funding goals, as indicated on their website. 
Although many factors can influence a campaign’s success, it has been reported that funds from 
early backers are often the only difference between a project reaching the funding goal or not [39]. 
Early contributions matter in two ways. First, this information signals the quality of the project to 
potential backers. This signal can in turn trigger social learning behavior [40], which is particularly 
important to stimulate sustainable models, and increase contributions from other potential backers 
[41]. Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018), using a sample of 25,058 Kickstarter projects, showed that 
prospective backers usually make their pledging decisions based on how much of the project goal 
has already been funded by others [38]. Second, backers who have made an early contribution are 
likely to spread information about the project, which may attract additional contributions [42]. Both 
reasons indicate the importance of early backers’ contributions to a campaign’s success.  
In this sense, our experiment is designed to measure the causal effect of some previous backers’ 
choices and recommendations on the behavior of posterior choices. Therefore, our paper is related to 
works that build on the insights from observational learning and other social influence research. 
Empirically, previous research has shown robust evidence of herding behavior in lending-based 
platforms [10,11,15–18]. Specifically, Astebro et al. (2018) show that the size and likelihood of a pledge 
is affected by the size and by the time elapsed since the most recent pledge, and Chan et al. (2019), 
also incorporating signals such as videos and entrepreneurs´ passion, propose a U-shaped 
relationship between prior funding and subsequent contributions—a relationship that is negative 
when funding amounts are small and positive when prior funding amounts are large. Our controlled 
experiment has not been designed to analyze different sizes and timings of previous backers’ choices. 
In addition, several studies have run randomized controlled experiments where a treatment 
group receives an early donation or recommendations and the control group does not [19–25,43,44]. 
Although most of them have found that early contributions and positive opinions explain significant 
increments in subsequent contributions, not all of them have reached this result. Koning and Model 
(2013) and Zaggl and Block (2019) both found that projects to which they made a small initial 
contribution (e.g., $5) significantly decreased the probability of success. Our results, however, are in 
line with the general evidence of herding behavior in reward-based platforms. 
Herding occurs when the observed behavior of others is used to inform one’s decision, 
mimicking this behavior. Herding can help improve the decision of the imitating individual [13]. The 
theoretical explanation for herding behavior is that the observed behavior reveals information that 
would not otherwise be available to the decision maker. Therefore, the uncertainty is reduced. 
Herding is considered rational when the observed behavior of others is used appropriately and 
improves decision making [13,14,45–47]. 
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It can also be irrational, that is, when observed behavior reduces decision quality, for example 
when the information is overestimated or information cascades filter behaviors that lead to 
suboptimal decisions. For example, rational investors with similar stock preferences adopt the same 
response to similar information about company characteristics and fundamentals. When the herding 
of investors is rational in response to new information, herding moves prices toward the fundamental 
value of assets; price movement is not likely to reverse. By contrast, irrational herding occurs when 
investors with insufficient information and inadequate risk evaluation disregard their prior beliefs 
and blindly follow other investors’ actions. Non-information based herding might lead to market 
inefficiencies, drive asset prices away from fundamental values, and cause asset mispricing. Thus, 
our work also relates to the theoretical literature on rational herding [13,14,45–47], rational herding 
in financial markets [48–50] and rational herding in crowdfunding [51].  
However, none of these models was fit to guide the detection of rational herding in our 
experiment. We develop a model that rationalizes herding behavior in crowdfunding. Our model 
deals with the backers’ strategic uncertainty and models backers’ beliefs as a random variable, whose 
mean is updated over time, by Bayesian methods, as new information is announced. Thus, we 
analyze the backers’ best response to the platform actions, which gives a theoretical support to our 
experimental results. Information-based actions need time to update and review choices. In general, 
it is not easy to precisely distinguish rational herding from irrational herding. In empirical papers 
one can analyze times series data and observe the evolution across time (for example, [48–50]), but 
with two periods we could only rely on the two observed distributions of choices and behavioral 
learning. In spite of these difficulties we set expectations about when we should observe rational 
herding and when we should not.  
Chakraborty and Swinney consider an entrepreneur designing a fixed funding reward-based 
crowdfunding campaign for an innovative product [52]. Product quality is known to the 
entrepreneur but unknown to some backers. They employ a game theoretic model of signaling 
between an entrepreneur and campaign backers. They study how the entrepreneur can signal quality 
to backers via the design of the crowdfunding campaign, including the price of the reward and the 
funding target. The signals in our model, either the number of contributors to the different projects 
or the opinions posted on the platform by peers and experts, are different, and can be seen as signals 
of social approval and trustworthiness. 
Miglo and Miglo (2019), in turn, consider entrepreneurial moral hazard related to the 
entrepreneur’s equity stake in the project, while his individual effort is costly, and this cost is not 
shared [31]. The crucial aspect here is the update of the market’s beliefs. The authors consider either 
the normal Bayesian rule, or that a lot of information becomes available regarding the product’s 
quality as a result of market participants’ interactions with each other and with the firm, and then the 
extent of asymmetric information is reduced. In contrast, we isolate the analysis of market beliefs and 
analyze their influence on backers’ choices. We do not model the platform’s best response to the 
backers’ beliefs, which leaves moral hazard problems out of the scope of our study. 
3. Research method 
3.1. The Theoretical Model 
In this subsection we offer a theoretical model that rationalizes herding behavior by backers in 
a reward-based crowdfunding platform.  
Consider a crowdfunding platform where two similar projects have been launched. There are 
two different scenarios (or treatments). The first one offers basic information about the projects (e.g., 
their characteristics and the funding goal, the campaign duration); the second offers more detailed 
information (e.g., the money already pledged by early backers, the number of backers that have 
already chosen a given project, or the opinions of other backers and experts). A finite set of backers 
decide which project to fund. Assume that the campaign lasts for two periods and that backers make 
decisions in each of them. The first scenario is denoted t = 1 and, accordingly, the second is t = 2. Thus, 
at t =  1, backers only know that there are two similar projects with the same funding goal. However, 
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9827 6 of 21 
at time 1 < t < 2, the crowdfunding platform announces some new information to the backers, who 
again make decisions at t = 2. This two-period dynamic model will allow us to capture the changes 
in choices, if any, from t = 1 to t = 2, where new information has been added.  
Each backer must decide which of two comparable projects to fund. A project is deemed 
successful if it achieves its funding goal, which is the same for both projects. Rational backers make 
decisions that maximize their utility given their knowledge and conjectures regarding other agents’ 
decisions. Backers have a well-defined Bernoulli utility function (or preferences) for projects  ( ) or 
 ( ), and they make decisions under uncertainty. A major source of uncertainty is the probability of 
success, namely whether the campaign will reach its funding goal and be financed. To know the 
probability of success of a project would imply knowing the other backers’ choices. Therefore, 
because initially there is neither information about, nor coordination among, backers, they must 
assign a prior probability of the likelihood of success of the projects to solve their decision problem 
under strategic uncertainty. 
Given the underlying uncertainty, rational backers maximize their project’s expected utility. 
Thus, letting   and   denote the two projects, each backer interprets them as uncertain prospects 
(or lotteries) with an assigned probability of success. Let   denote the probability of success of 
project  . Therefore, at time   =  1, each backer compares the expected utility of the two projects 
and chooses the one with the highest expected utility: Project   will be chosen by a backer if and 
only if  [ ( | )]≥  [ ( |(1 −  )]; similarly, project   will be chosen by a backer if and only if 
 [ ( |(1 −  )] ≥   [ ( | )]. Recall that at   =  1, there is no information on the aggregate amount 
already pledged to the projects or on the number of backers supporting them. Therefore, potential 
backers must make subjective conjectures about  .  
At 1 < t < 2, certain specific pieces of information are added. As in the first situation, backers 
update their beliefs about the probability of success, say  ̂  =  ( /           ),  and choose the 
project with the highest expected utility given this information. Thus, a backer prefers A to B, 
whenever: 
 [ ( | ̂)] ≥  [ (  |(1 −  ̂)] (1) 
This information refers, for example, to the number of backers having already chosen A or B, 
that the platform announces at 1< t < 2. Choices are made at t = 2. Now, depending on the new 
probability of success of A, a backer may change the choice made in a situation without extensive 
information (Scenario 1) to a new choice in a situation with more information (Scenario 2). The model 
is then a two-stage dynamic decision model, where backers depart from a situation of no information, 
update their beliefs,  , by Bayes’ rule, obtain new beliefs,  ̂, and make choice decisions at t = 2. 
3.2. Dealing with Strategic Uncertainty 
An important piece of the analysis is to model backers’ beliefs about the probability of success 
of the projects. Consider the prior probability distribution of the probability of success of project  . 
A realistic assumption is to assume that, given the strategic uncertainty about other backers’ decision, 
each backer has no information about this distribution. Therefore, an appropriate way to model this 
distribution is to assume that p is a random variable with a given distribution. Backers have no 
information about this distribution.  
We may then assume that it is common knowledge that    follows a beta distribution: 
 ~    ( ,  ). The beta distribution is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the 
interval [0, 1] and parametrized by two positive shape parameters,    and   , which appear as 
exponents of the random variable and control the shape of the distribution (a special case is when α 
= β = 1, which coincides with the uniform distribution on [0, 1]). This distribution represents a family 
of probabilities and is a versatile way to represent outcomes for percentages or proportions. Beta 
distributions can be understood as representing probability distributions of probabilities; in other 
words, they represent all possible values of a probability when these values are unknown. The 
expected value, or mean ( ), of a beta distribution random variable   with two parameters   and   
is a function of only the ratio,  / , of these parameters. 
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 [ ]  =  
 
  +  
   (2) 
          [ ]  =  
  
(  +   +  )(  +  ) 
   (3) 
Hence, backers will choose project    whenever  [ ( | )  =   ( ) ( ) ≥   ( ) (1 −  )  =
  [ ( |(1 −  )], and the other way around.  




. Thus,  ( )  =  
 
 
,  and  [ ( | )  =   ( ) ( )  =   ( ) × 1/2  and  [ ( | )  =   ( ) (1 −  )  =
  ( ) × 1/2.  
When new information is released at time t, backers update their common prior distribution by 
Bayes’ rule. Thus, let the new information consist of informing about the number of backers that have 
already chosen project    and    at time t. Then, the posterior distribution of the probability of 
success (i.e., the new distribution of   conditional on this information) is distribution 
 ̂~    (  +  ,   +  ), with mean 
 (  )  =  
  +  
  +   +   +  
 (4) 
With   =    =  
 
 
, the above equation translates to  
 (  )  =  
  +   
 (  +   +  )
 (5) 
And, consequently, backers will choose project A whenever: 
 [ ( | ̂)  =   ( ) ×  
1 + 2 
2(1 +   +  )
≥  ( ) ×
1 + 2 
2(1 +   +  )
 
3.3. The Impact of New Information 
Backers do not see the real choices of projects over the two periods of time, but we, as 
theoreticians, do. A way to observe the impact of information on beliefs, and hence on choices, is to 
compare the posterior distributions once the choices have been made, before and after the 
information release. Then, suppose that we see the project choices with prior probability distribution 
 , and that    denotes the observed choices of project   and    those of  . As seen above, the 











Now, after the first choice in time   =  1, some information is released at time  , and then 




, as computed above.  
Then, again, choices are made in   =  2 . The theorist observes these choices and updates 
 ̂, her prior distribution now, conditional to the observed choices in   =  2. Suppose that   choices 
of project   and   choices of project   have been observed. The posterior distribution of  ̂ is 




From a theoretical point of view, the impact of information on choice behavior comes from the 
analysis of the two posterior distributions  ’  and  ′  . Namely, by comparing their means and 
observing whether there has been a shift to the right or to the left, that is, which have been the backers’ 
best responses to the information release. Recalling that   denotes the probability distribution of the 
success of project  , a shift to the right leads to a positive impact on the number of backers choosing 
project  . Furthermore, whenever the distribution variances are the same, these shifts mean that a 
distribution dominates the other distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.  
We next summarize the timing of the two-period model and the corresponding updating.  
3.4. Timing Summary 
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9827 8 of 21 
Agents: a crowdfunding platform and a finite set of homogeneous backers.  
t = 1: The platform launches two projects with basic information and backers make a choice 
between projects A and B. The choice depends on their utility value (or preferences) for the projects 
and their prior probability of success of them. The prior distribution of the probability of success of 
project A is denoted by  .  
Choices made by backers give rise to a posterior probability distribution of success of project A, 
conditional to the choices in t = 1,  ′ =  ( │          ℎ     1), which is not observed by backers.  
1 < t < 2: The platform adds new information on its web page. This information refers to the 
number of backers that have already chosen projects A and B at t.  
With this information and following Bayes’ rule, backers update their beliefs about the 
probability of success p, obtaining  ̂  =  ( │           ) 
t = 2: Backers choose again between projects A and B, according to distribution  . 
Choices made by backers give rise to a new updating of distribution  ̂ (now the new prior 
probability distribution), conditional to the choices in t = 2, yielding the posterior probability 
distribution of success  ′   =  ( │          ℎ     2), which is not observed by backers.  
The following figure illustrates the different Bayesian updating,  
Platform Backers Platform Backers 
A, B Choices Release of partial 
information 
Choices 
 t = 1 t t = 2 
  Theoretical updating of   Backers’ updating Theoretical updating of   
   = ( |          ℎ     1);     ̂ = ( |           );   ′  = ( │          ℎ     2) 
This model will help us rationalize backers choices and to ascertain whether the herding is 
rational.  
3.5. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is generally well suited to economic and psychological 
experiments because it provides instant access to a large and culturally diverse subject pool [53]. For 
experiments on subject behavior in the online sharing economy, such as the present experiment, 
MTurk is especially appropriate because the subjects in the pool are familiar with online platforms 
and culture, simulating crowdfunding backers. These advantages outweigh the loss in control of 
attentiveness while making decisions with respect to laboratory-based economic experiments. 
Moreover, experimental comparisons between attentiveness by undergraduates and MTurk subjects 
[54–56] generally validate MTurk’s suitability for data collection by confirming that classical 
heuristics, biases, and levels of attentiveness to directions are comparable to those in traditional 
subject pools. Furthermore, it has been shown that, for samples with only highly reputed MTurk 
subjects (HIT approval rate > 95%), such as those in the present experiment, data quality is higher in 
terms of the attention check questions (ACQs) [57]. 
We sought to explore the decisions of crowdfunders (backers) when dealing with new 
information in online crowdfunding markets. We also sought to examine possible gender and 
cultural effects. Therefore, we replicated a reward-based crowdfunding webpage and ran an 
economic experiment with 847 MTurk users from the United States and India (500 men; 347 women) 
(Subjects from USA and India can easily get the economic rewards from the MTurk platform. 
However, subjects from other countries, as those in the EU, for example, are not allowed to get paid 
in cash).  
Specifically, experimental subjects had to make choices in two situations. In the first one, the 
decision concerned the choice between two travel books, and in the second, the choice was between 
two cookery books. Tables 1 and 2 provide more details of the experiment, and Appendix 1, available 
in the Supplementary Materials, offers the screenshots and instructions. 
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This study experimentally tested subjects’ decisions in two scenarios (hereinafter treatments), 
following the method presented in the previous section. 
As shown in Table 1, the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) economic experiment began by 
presenting Situation 1, which explores how information about money already pledged by early 
backers affects backers’ beliefs. Situation 2, presented in Table 2, in contrast, explores how 
information about other backers’ and experts’ opinions affects beliefs. Each situation was presented 
in two treatments. Additional information was revealed in Treatment 2.  
Table 1. Experimental design of Situation 1. 
Situation 1 (Travel Books) 





Book A Book B 





Subjects started the experiment with an initial endowment of $60 each and were asked to 
contribute $15 to one of two projects aiming to publish a book in each treatment of each situation 
(Book A or Book B in Situation 1 and Book C or Book D in Situation 2). All projects had the same 
funding goal and deadline. A book was successful if 70% or more participants chose to finance that 
book. Subjects received a show-up fee of $0.50 plus a bonus of $0.15 per successful project chosen. 
The subjects from India received different payoffs in line with purchasing power parity. They 
received a show-up fee of $0.25, and the bonus per successful project was $0.07.  
Treatment 1 of Situation 1 asked participants to contribute $15 to one of two travel book projects 
(Book A or Book B) based on the book cover. Later, in Treatment 2, information was released stating 
that Book A had already been financed by 35 backers (which meant 10% of backers needed for 
success, with 315 potential backers left) and that Book B had been financed by only four backers 
(which meant 1.14% of backers needed for success, with 345 potential backers left). Participants were 
asked to make their second choice and contribute another $15 to one of the two travel book projects 
(Book A or Book B). 
Table 2. Experimental design of Situation 2. 
Situation 2 (cookery books) 





Book C Book D 
Book C Book D 
  $425 raised 
30 backers 
 $425raised 
  30 backers 
2 negative    
peers’ reviews 







As shown in Table 2, Situation 2, in contrast, explores how information about other backers’ and 
experts‘ opinions affects beliefs. Similarly, Treatment 1 of Situation 2 asked participants to contribute 
$15 to one of the two projects (Book C or Book D) based on the book cover. Later, in Treatment 2, 
investors were shown three opinions per book. Book C had two negative comments from previous 
backers and one positive comment from an expert. Conversely, Book D had positive 
recommendations from two previous backers and a negative recommendation from one expert. It 
was also revealed that both projects had raised $450 from 30 backers. As contributions from early 
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9827 10 of 21 
investors were identical for both books, the only difference lay in the opinions: peer opinion was 
expected to act as a proxy for other participants’ choices, as in Huang and Chen’s 13 analysis of 
buyer behavior in online product choice. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects answered five demographic questions on education level, 
number of children, household income, employment status, and age. These responses were used as 
control variables. The experiment was launched in January 2019 through Amazon MTurk and was 
sent to 1000 subjects. These subjects had an approval rate of more than 95% from previous requesters, 
meaning that 95% of previous employers had been satisfied with workers’ performance. Of these 
subjects, 500 were located in the United States and 500 were located in India. The aim was to recruit 
250 women and 250 men in each country. However, we could recruit only 97 women in India within 
the time limit. Thus, 847 subjects participated in the experiment: 250 women and 250 men from the 
United States and 97 women and 250 men from India. Most had high school diplomas or higher 
education (63.60% from the United States and 96.82% from India). 
The experiment launched in the United States had two successful projects, Book A in Situation 
1 Treatment 2, and Book D in Situation 2 Treatment 2. However, the replication in India had no 
successful projects. Similarly, Treatment 1 had no successful projects, given that no additional 
information was shown in this treatment. Thus, subjects did not overwhelmingly choose any one 
project. The average payment, including the show-up fee and bonus, was $0.697 in the United States 
and $0.25 in India. Subjects received no feedback until the end of the experiment, when all choices 
had been made.  
3.6. Hypothesis 
Our first hypothesis is that early contributions affect backers’ beliefs about the campaign’s 
probability of success, thereby increasing contributions to the campaign, that is,  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is herding behavior. 
The second hypothesis is more elaborated: we contrast the hypothesis that the above herding is 
rational against irrational herding.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Herding is rational.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Herding is irrational.  
Finally, our last hypothesis is that positive opinions of peers, as shown nowadays in online social 
networks, are more important than experts’ comments in increasing campaign contributions. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Positive opinions of peers about a project are more important than those of experts.  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Overview 
Figure 1 illustrates the MTurk subjects’ choices of which project (book) to fund in each situation. 
As expected, under the theoretical model described earlier, subjects significantly changed their 
crowdfunding choices once new information had been released (from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2) in 
both situations. Information on early investors was released in Treatment 2 of Situation 1: Book A 
had already been financed by 10% of the backers needed to reach the funding goal, and Book B had 
already been financed by 1.14% of the backers needed. As shown in Figure 1, 62.7% of subjects choose 
to finance Book A after receiving this information. Before receiving this information, only 35.4% of 
subjects had chosen to finance Book A. Thus, subjects changed their beliefs about the probability of 
success of Book A and Book B and chose the project with highest expected utility given this 
information. The difference of 8.86 percentage points in early backers (10% for Book A – 1.14% for 
Book B) acted as a proxy of project success. Thus, subjects chose Book A to fund a project with a 
higher probability of success.  




Figure 1. Book A’s choices (Situation 1) and Book C’s choices (Situation 2) in %, per treatment: without 
and with information. The total sample consists of 847 subjects (500 men and 347 women). 
Interestingly, in Situation 2, previous backers’ positive opinions acted as a proxy for the project’s 
probability of success. Book C had two negative comments from previous backers and one positive 
comment from an expert. Conversely, Book D had positive recommendations from two previous 
backers and a negative recommendation from one expert. As Figure 1 shows, subjects significantly 
reduced their choices of Book C (from 59.4% to 39.3%) and predominantly chose to finance Book D, 
which had positive peer comments (despite a negative expert review). This information changed 
subjects’ funding choices, as predicted by the theoretical model described earlier, because of a change 
in backers’ beliefs about the projects’ probability of success. 
Tables 3 and 4 present more detailed experimental results, breaking down subjects’ choices by 
country and gender. Table 3 provides a detailed overview of the results in Situation 1. The increase 
in funds pledged to Book A was significant among both male and female backers from the United 
States and among men from India. Information on early investors released in Treatment 2 had a 
significant effect on these three groups. The group of women from India also increased funding for 
Book A. However, this increase was not significant, probably because of the small number of subjects 
in this group (only 97 women from India versus 250 subjects in each of the other three groups). Panel 
B of Table 3 shows the subjects’ choices in Treatment 2, while Panel A shows the changes in choices. 
The expression “A/B” denotes subjects’ switching from funding Book A in Treatment 1 (without 
information) to funding Book B in Treatment 2 (with information), and “B/A” denotes subjects’ 
switching from funding Book B in Treatment 1 (without information) to funding Book A in Treatment 
2 (with information). All groups (men from the United States, women from the United States, men 
from India, and women from India) primarily changed from funding Book B in Treatment 1 to 
funding Book A in Treatment 2, once information on early backers had been released. Therefore, no 
significant gender differences were present in this subject pool.  
Table 3. Situation I. Testing the influence of early investment on investment decisions. Frequencies 
and p-values by gender and country. 
Panel A. Change in subject choice between Treatments 1 and 2 (with added information) 
H0: A/B = B/A Men Women Men + Women 
Country A/B1 B/A A/B B/A A/B B/A 
USA 
 
Number 6 89 7 94 13 183 
% 6.32 93.68 6.93 93.07 6.63 93.37 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
India Number 21 72 15 25 36 97 
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 % 22.58 77.42 37.50 62.50 27.07 72.93 




Number 27 161 22 119 49 280 
% 14.36 85.64 15.60 84.40 14.89 85.11 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
Panel B. Subject choice in Treatment 2 (with added information) 
H0: A = B Men Women Men + Women 
Country A B A B A B 
USA 
 
Number 168 82 157 93 325 175 
% 67.20 32.80 62.80 37.20 65.00 35.00 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
India 
 
Number 151 99 55 42 206 141 
% 60.40 39.60 56.70 43.30 59.37 40.63 




Number 319 181 212 135 531 316 
% 63.80 36.20 61.10 38.90 62.69 37.31 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
1 A/B denotes subjects’ switching from funding Book A in Treatment 1 to funding Book B in Treatment 
2 (with added information), and so on. Treatment 2: Prior to subject choices, Book A had achieved 
10% of the required funds, whereas Book B had achieved 1.14% of the required funds. 
Table 4 presents detailed results for Situation 2. As shown in Panel B (subject’s choices in 
Treatment 2), the increase in funds pledged to Book D was significant among both male and female 
backers from the United States. However, men and women from India did not significantly increase 
their funding of Book D once information on peers’ and experts’ opinions had been released in 
Treatment 2. Panel A shows the changes in choices. The expression “C/D” denotes subjects’ switching 
from funding Book C in Treatment 1 (without information) to funding Book D in Treatment 2 (with 
information), and “D/C” denotes subjects’ switching from funding Book D in Treatment 1 (without 
information) to funding Book C in Treatment 2 (with information). 
Table 4. Situation II. Testing the influence of peer and expert opinions on the investment decision. 
Frequencies and p-values by gender and country. 
Panel A. Change in subject choice between Treatments 1 and 2 (with added information). 
H0: C/D = D/C Men Women Men + Women 
Country C/D2 D/C C/D D/C C/D D/C 
USA 
 
Number 52 3 83 4 135 7 
% 94.55 5.45 95.40 4.60 95.07 4.93 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p = 0.017 p < 0.0001 
India 
 
Number 49 26 28 9 77 35 
% 65.33 34.67 75.68 24.32 68.75 31.25 
Proportion test p = 0.011 p = 0.005 p < 0.0001 
Number 101 29 111 13 212 42 
% 77.69 22.31 89.52 10.48 83.46 16.54 




Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
Panel B. Subject choice in Treatment 2 (with added information). 
H0: C = D Men Women Men + Women 
Country C D C D C D 
USA 
 
Number 86 164 83 167 169 331 
% 34.40 65.60 33.20 66.80 33.80 66.20 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
India 
 
Number 121 129 43 54 164 183 
% 48.40 51.60 44.33 55.67 47.26 52.74 




Number 207 293 126 221 333 514 
% 41.40 58.60 36.31 63.69 39.32 60.68 
Proportion test p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
2 C/D denotes subjects’ switching from funding Book C to funding Book D in Treatment 2 (with added 
information), and so on. Treatment 2: Prior to subject choices, Book C was recommended by an expert 
and criticized by peers, whereas Book D was recommended by peers and criticized by an expert. 
Whenever changes in choices were made, they were overwhelmingly in the direction of 
increasing funding for Book D in all groups (men from the United States, women from the United 
States, men from India, and women from India), once information on peers’ and experts’ 
recommendations had been released. Specifically, 101 men changed from funding Book C to funding 
Book D (only 29 men changed in the opposite direction), while 111 women changed from funding 
Book C to funding Book D (only 13 women changed in the opposite direction). Note that Book C had 
received two negative opinions from previous backers and one positive expert opinion, whereas Book 
D had positive recommendations from two previous backers and a negative recommendation from 
one expert. Again, no significant gender differences were found in this subject pool. 
The results of our first econometric tests show that early contributions to a project increase 
successive contributions to the project, and that positive peer reviews of a project are more important 
than the negative opinions of experts on the same project. Therefore: 
Result 1. H1 is accepted: There is herding behavior by backers.  
Result 2. H4 is accepted: Positive peer reviews of a project are more important than the negative 
opinions of experts on the same project.  
These findings are in line with main empirical and randomized experiments literature [19,20,37–
40]. 
4.2. Analysis of the Aggregate Results 
In this section we analyze and compare the choices made by backers in our experiment in t = 1 
and in t = 2, and check whether our experimental results exhibit rational herding. This comparison 
also allows us to check the robustness of the results. We start with situation 1 and first present the 
statistical analysis of the experimental data with the McNemar test, because the data are dichotomous 
variables. The test tells us if there is a statistically significant change in the probability distribution of 
the choice. 
The McNemar test is a non-parametric statistical test. It is applied to two dichotomous variables 
to test changes in answers using the chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. The 
purpose is to compare the change in the proportion distribution between two measurements of a 
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dichotomous variable and determine whether this difference is not random. A value of   <  0.05 
provides sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
the marginal proportions are significantly different from each other. An interesting observation when 
interpreting the McNemar test is that the elements on the main diagonal do not contribute to 
decisions about whether the pre- or post-experimental condition is more favorable. 
Table 5 shows the 2 × 2 table, together with the marginal probabilities, for the McNemar test 
for Situation 1. The McNemar test for Situation 1 gives a significance of   <  0.0001, for 847 valid 
cases. Because   <  0.05, the test provides sufficient evidence that new information about early 
backers released in Treatment 2 changes the distribution of subjects’ choices. 
Table 5. Results of the McNemar test 
Situation 1 






























As shown in Table 5, in Treatment 1, 300 backers (35.4%) chose to finance Book A, and 547 
(64.58%) chose to finance Book B. However, once information about early backers had been released 
in Treatment 2, the distribution of choices changed substantially: 531 backers (62.7%) chose to finance 
Book A, and only 316 (37.3%) chose to finance Book B. This change was due to the transfer of 280 
backers (33.06%) from Book B to Book A. Those who formerly chose to finance Book A kept this choice 
in Treatment 2 (only 49 backers changed from Book A to Book B). 
4.3. Rationalizing Backers´ Behavior 
What is the reason for this change in the distribution of choices? We argue that, after the 
information about early backers had been released, backers updated their beliefs about the projects’ 
probability of success and maximized their expected utility given these new beliefs. 
To model backers’ beliefs and the updating of these beliefs, we followed the theoretical 
framework described earlier, assuming that backers’ beliefs about the probability of success,  , of 
Book A followed a beta distribution. 
To capture the no-information choice, we assumed that   =    =  
 
 







mean  ( )  =  
 
 
 (see Equation (2)) and variance  [ ]  =  
 
 
 (see Equation (3)). With these beliefs, 
backers maximized their expected utility and chose a project, with 64.58% choosing Book B.  
In Treatment 2, the subjects discovered that 35 backers (10% of the necessary backers) had 
already funded Book A, while only four backers (1.14% of the necessary backers) had funded Book 
B. This information revealed a difference of 8.86% percentage points in early backers. Note that the 
backers did not know the distribution of the initial choices. Therefore, the Bayesian updating of 
beliefs,  , by backers gave them a prior distribution for the new situation,  ̂  =  ( |           ), 
distributed as follows (see Equation (5)): 












 =  0.887, and variance  ( ̂)  =  0.0024. 
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Accordingly, in Treatment 2, backers assigned a mean probability of 88.7% to the success of Book 
A. With these beliefs, they maximized their expected utility and newly chose a project, resulting in 
62.7% of them choosing Book A. 
Analytically, the impact of the information on backers’ choices is explained by comparing the 
two posterior distributions of choices without information (Treatment 1) and with information 
(Treatment 2). A shift to the right would lead to a positive impact on the number of backers choosing 
project A.  
In Treatment 1 the posterior distribution of the probability of success of Book A, (taking the data 
from Table 5)  ′, is: 







with mean  ( ′)  =  
     / 
     
 =  0.354, and variance  ( ′) =  0.00027 
This distribution is centered on 35.4% of backers choosing Book A. After the release of 
information about early backers (Treatment 2) by the crowdfunding platform, the new choices have 
the following posterior distribution of the probability of success of Book A (recall that the prior 
distribution to update is now  ̂, and that the data are again from Table 5):  
 ̂   =  ( |           ,  ℎ      )~      531 + 35 +
1
2
, 316 + 4 +
1
2
   (8) 





 =  0.639; and variance  ( ̂  )  =  0.00025. 
This posterior distribution is now centered on 63.9% of backers choosing Book A once the 
information about early backers has been released. 
Comparing the means of the two updated posterior distributions, we observe that  ( ̂  )  =
 0.639 > 0.354 =   ( ′), that is, distribution  ̂  is a shift to the right to distribution  ’. Given that 
these distributions are the updating of the distribution of the probability of success of project A, a 
shift to the right leads to a positive impact on the number of backers choosing project A. Furthermore, 
given that the two distribution variances are basically the same, we could say that distribution 
 ̂  first-order stochastically dominates distribution  ’.  
This theoretical positive impact on the number of backers choosing project A is corroborated by 
the one statistically obtained in Table 5. Therefore, our theoretical model explains the impact of new 
information on (experimental) backers’ choices. 
Thus, information on the difference of 8.86 percentage points in early backers in favor of Book 
A caused the former distribution to shift to the right, leading to a positive impact on the number of 
backers choosing Book A. This change was due to the updated beliefs on the probability of Book A’s 
success, which increased backers’ expected utility of choosing Book A over Book B. Therefore, the so-
called herding behavior of crowdfunding backers can be rationalized by assuming rational backers 
who follow the Bayesian updating of beliefs and expected utility theory. 
Rational Herding:  
In order to accept the hypothesis of rational herding (H2) against that of irrational herding (H3), 
we have to set up when we may expect rational herding in crowdfunding campaigns. We depart 
from the distribution of initial choices of project A in t = 1, that is centered on the 35.4% of backers 
choosing Book A. Rational herding is information-based, while irrational herding implies that 
backers mimic others when choosing a project.  
Information-based actions need time to update and review choices. In general, it is not easy to 
precisely distinguish rational herding from irrational herding. In empirical papers one can analyze 
times series data, and observe the evolution across time (for example, [48–50]), but with two periods 
we could only rely on the two observed distributions of choices and behavioral learning.  
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Therefore, our hypothesis for rational herding is that we expect, after information release, an 
increase in the mean distribution of choices between 25% and the 50%. Roughly speaking, the 
hypothesis implies that the number of backers choosing book A after information release has to 
belong to the interval (513, 723). As an example, the lower bound could be achieved if 80% of the 
backers initially choosing book A (300) would choose A again after information release, and 50% of 
the initial backers choosing B (547) would later choose A instead. Similarly, the upper bound would 
be achieved if, say, 95% of the backers choosing initially book A would choose A again, and 80% of 
the backers initially choosing B would change to A. Therefore, if we observe less than 513 backers 
choosing A or more than 723 choosing A, after receiving information, we will conclude that herding 
is irrational.   
The rationale for this hypothesis is that an increase of less than 25% would imply that backers 
do not pay attention to information signals, and an increase bigger than 50% would mean that backers 
blindly follow the crew. These increments in the mean distribution of backers choosing A would give 
us a mean of A choices confidence interval at 95%, Ih (95%), equal to 
Ih (95%) = (60,4%, 85,4%) (9) 
Now, consider the posterior distribution of choices in t = 2. The calculation of the mean of A 
choices confidence interval at 95%, I (95%), gives us: 
I (95%) = (60,6%, 67%) ⊂ (60,4%, 85,4%) = Ih (95%) (10) 
As we see above, this interval is contained within the hypothesized interval (60,4%, 85,4%). 
Therefore, we claim that herding is (Bayesian) rational. Note, moreover, that the mean of the 
distribution in the MacNemar test gives us 62.7% that also belongs to Ih (95%).  
Result 3. H2 is accepted: Herding is rational. 
Result 4. H3 is rejected: Herding is irrational.  
Afterwards, we repeated the analysis for Situation 2. Here, the information released concerns 
the positive or negative opinions of peers and those of professionals. As above, we show first the 
statistical analysis of the data from the experiment, in Table 6. 
Table 6. Results of the McNemar test. 
Situation 2 
 Treatment 2 (with Added Information) 
Treatment I 






















Table 6 presents the results of the McNemar test for the choices in Situation 2. The McNemar test 
had a significance of   <  0.0001 for 847 valid cases. Because   <  0.05, the test provides sufficient 
evidence that information on peer recommendations changes the distribution of choices. 
As shown in Table 6, 503 backers in Treatment 1 (59.38%) chose to finance Book C, and 344 
(40.62%) chose to finance Book D. However, once information about peers’ (and experts’) 
recommendations had been released in Treatment 2, the distribution of choices changed: only 333 
(39.32%) backers chose to finance Book C, and 514 (60.68%) chose Book D. This change was due to 
the transfer of 212 backers (25.03%) from Book C to Book D. Those who formerly chose to finance 
Book D kept this choice in Treatment 2: only 42 backers, 4.96%, changed from Book D to Book C. 
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9827 17 of 21 







 , with mean  ( )  =  
 
 
 and variance  ( )  =  
 
 
. With these beliefs, backers maximized 
their project’s expected utility and chose one of them. 






), with mean  (  )  =  0.59, or a distribution centered on 59% of backers choosing Book C, 
with a variance of (  )  =  0.00028. As in Situation 1, this distribution was not observed by the 
backers.  
Later, in Treatment 2, information about peer opinion was released. Specifically, backers 
discovered that Book C had received two negative opinions from buyers (backers) and one positive 
opinion from an expert, while Book D had received two positive opinions from buyers and a negative 
opinion from an expert. Modeling the updated   for backers based on this information would have 
been difficult, although they found a way to do it. We did not follow this approach; instead, we 
observed backers’ choices in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 and compared their corresponding 
posterior distributions. The posterior distribution for choices in Treatment 2, where only 39% of the 
backers chose Book C, was: 






   (11) 
with mean  ( ̂  )  =  0.39, and variance of  ( ̂  )  =  0.00028. 
Now, the comparison of the means of the two posterior distributions shows that  ( ̂  )  =  0.39 
< 0.59 =   (  ), meaning a shift to the left of distribution   and leading to a negative impact on the 
number of backers choosing project C. Thus, here, distribution    first-order statistically dominates 
distribution  ̂  . This result coincides with the statistical analysis of Table 6.  
Given the shift to the left of the backers’ conditional prior distribution of Book C’s probability of 
success, the results show that the two positive opinions offered by buyers (backers or peers) 
outweighed the negative expert opinion. Book C, which had a reduced posterior probability of 
success, had received one positive expert opinion and two negative opinions from buyers. In other 
words, peer opinion (i.e., the opinions of buyers) was more important to update backers’ beliefs and 
change backers’ beliefs about the project’s probability of success and the distribution of choices.  
The comparison of the McNemar test and the theoretical model allows us to check the robustness 
of the results. Additionally, it suggests that rational herding occurred in the experimental setting, as 
the experimental results are supported by the theoretical model. Revealing information influences 
backers’ beliefs regarding projects’ probability of success and, consequently, alters backers’ choices, 
following a model of rational herding: 
Result 5. The theoretical model and McNemar test support H4: positive peer reviews of a project are 
more important than the negative opinions of experts on the same project. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Crowdfunding has attracted much attention in recent years as a fast-growing way of financing 
environmental and social sustainable initiatives. Given that most crowdfunding campaigns do not 
succeed in securing funds and that herding is widespread among crowdfunding backers, 
understanding the mechanisms behind herding is of immense importance to design management 
strategies to succeed in funding social sustainable enterprises.  
Specifically, understanding the degree of rational herding in crowdfunding helps avoid 
underestimating herding by ignoring powerful rational drivers that contribute to irrational herding 
behavior. Rational herding requires observers to make unbiased inferences from the decisions they 
observe.  
In order to overcome the limitations that empirical research faces regarding control and 
causality, we have conducted an ad hoc controlled online economic experiment in MTurk where 847 
subjects were rewarded, depending on their decisions and those of others, with information and 
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payoff externalities, as occurs in crowdfunding markets. Mturk allowed us to get a diverse subject 
pool, including residents in the United States and in India, and an adjusted proportion of men and 
women, instead of the usual undergraduate population. 
The experiment was designed to test and quantify the causal effects of revealing specific 
information to prospective backers: (i) the number of early contributors already financing the project 
and (ii) positive opinions of other backers versus those of experts. 
The results of the controlled economic experiment showed a causal relationship between 
changes in the revealed information and the subjects’ observable decisions. We also developed a 
model that captures the effect of rational herding. The effect of rational herding was captured in the 
experimental setting and explained by the model: (i) early contributions to the campaign affected 
backers’ beliefs about the probability of funding success, thereby influencing choices to boost 
campaign contributions; a difference of 8.86 percentage points in early backers was enough to act as 
a proxy for project success; and (ii) positive opinions of peers were more important than expert 
opinions in increasing campaign contributions, acting as a proxy for subsequent contributions. No 
significant gender differences were found in those decisions. 
Thus, the experimental results were supported by the theoretical model on rational herding: 
revealing information influenced backers’ beliefs regarding projects’ probability of success and, 
consequently, altered backers’ choices. 
Our study contributes to the literature by showing causal relationships and explaining with the 
model of strategic uncertainty that rational herding behavior can be a powerful driver of herding 
behavior. Changes in investors’ choices observed in crowdfunding markets may be due to an 
adjustment in rational beliefs about the campaign’s probability of success. 
This research thus offers managers of innovative and environmental and social sustainable 
initiatives tools to succeed in crowdfunding: managers may increase backers’ beliefs about the 
projects’ probability of success by increasing early contributors and by getting positive opinions of 
other backers. For example, fundraisers might consider making an initial investment in their own 
projects, given the reluctance of crowdfunding backers to commit in the early days of a campaign, 
due to the high information asymmetry and uncertainty about the chances of success in reaching the 
funding goal. 
A limitation of our model is that we only allow backers to choose one of two projects and not 
both of them. This configuration simplifies the experiment and allows us to isolate the decision 
making that we seek to analyze. Another limitation refers to fixed contributions and short periods of 
time, so that our results cannot be related to other empirical findings such as the U-shape of the 
backer's responses found in some empirical literature. 
Besides the implications this research offers, future research may try to overcome the described 
limitations and verify our findings using other geographic contexts and subject pools. A more 
ambitious project would be to extend the model to several periods to see whether the U-shape form 
of backers’ responses, found in some empirical papers, is corroborated.  
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